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Introduction 
In November 2004, Georgia State University’s Andrew Young School of Policy Studies authored a “Policy 
Guide to the Evaluation and Use of Tax Allocation Districts” under contract with Research Atlanta, Inc.1 
The use of such districts by Georgia cities and counties and the innovative practice of tax increment 
financing (TIF) were enabled by the Georgia State Constitution of 1983 and the state’s Redevelopment 
Powers Act of 1985.2 The report noted the sudden surge in the popularity of this important economic 
development tool over the then preceding five years, while pointing out the absence of any systematic 
assessment of, or set of policies to guide, its use. The study went on to describe how tax allocation 
districts (TADs) work, the potential benefits and disadvantages of TIF, and what policies local 
governments should consider in more equitably distributing those benefits and risks among different 
stakeholder groups. This current report is intended as an update of the 2004 publication in light of 
experience and policy changes over time, as well as the impact of the Great Recession. 
TIF is a program whereby a local government designates a specific geographic area for development or 
redevelopment and then funds a portion of development costs with future incremental tax revenues 
generated within the TIF area. The tax revenues involved typically are incremental property taxes 
resulting from the increased property values created by the development but may also include local sales 
or excise tax revenues that increase due to new economic activity generated within the district. Tax 
increments may be used to finance land acquisition, site preparation and cleanup, infrastructure 
improvements and other project-related expenses that benefit private businesses that agree to locate 
their operations within the TAD. Often, the financing arrangement involves the issuance of tax increment, 
or tax allocation, bonds that provide upfront money to pay for such improvements, with debt service on 
the bonds paid from the incremental tax revenues generated. 
The self-financing aspect of TIF has added to its popularity in Georgia and in many other states. This 
aspect differentiates it from other economic development tools, such as tax abatements, tax credits and 
direct subsidies. TIF remains the most-used incentive program among those currently available to local 
governments throughout the nation.3 Local governments began using TIF in the early 1950s, initially in 
conjunction with the federal government’s Urban Renewal Program, and adoption of the technique 
spread quickly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By the late 1990s, TIF had been authorized in all 50 
states and the District of Columbia – although Arizona repealed its TIF legislation in 1999, and California, 
                                                            
1 “Georgia’s Redevelopment Powers Law: A Policy Guide to the Evaluation and Use of Tax Allocation Districts.” Carolyn Bourdeaux 
and John Matthews (Research Atlanta, 2004). 
2 O.C.G.A. §36-44-1 et seq.  The Redevelopment Powers Law was reenacted by the Georgia General Assembly in 2009 in response 
to the Supreme Court of Georgia ruling in Woodham v. City of Atlanta, which struck down the use of school tax increments for 
redevelopment purposes. 
3 “The TIFF over TIF: A Review of the Literature Examining the Effectiveness of Tax Increment Financing.” Robert T. Greenbaum 
and Jim Landers (National Tax Journal, 2014). 
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which was the first state to embrace TIF, ended its use in 2012 as a result of local governments’ increased 
“cannibalization” of public schools’ property tax revenues.4 
California’s policy reversal, together with the economic turmoil caused by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
and the consequent real estate-related recession of 2008-2009, has triggered a re-examination of TIF use 
in other states and localities. This report analyzes the effects of those events on TIF throughout the 
country, in Georgia, and in the city of Atlanta. 
THE GREAT RECESSION 
The financial crisis that began in December 2007, and the 18-month recession that followed, was based in 
the growth and subsequent collapse of America’s residential real estate market. Both the crisis and the 
recession that followed it (often called the Great Recession) were caused by a real estate bubble – a rapid 
and unsustainable increase in housing prices. The real estate bubble was fueled, in turn, by a credit 
bubble, which resulted from the widespread loosening of credit standards for mortgages,5 as well as 
other consumer loans, and the consequent buying spree of bundled mortgage-backed securities and the 
even more complex, and opaque, collateralized debt obligations.6 
The crisis was triggered by well-intended policies that encouraged home ownership by providing easier 
access to mortgage loans for borrowers. This initially noble effort was complicated, however, by the 
complex interplay of overvalued subprime mortgages, the belief that housing prices would continue to 
escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers of bundled loans,7 
compensation structures that prioritized short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and the lack 
of adequate capital holdings of banks, investment banks and insurance companies to back the financial 
commitments they were making.8 The burgeoning catastrophe the crisis created quickly extended to 
commercial real estate, caused a worldwide liquidity crunch, a global recession that extended into 2012, 
and a European sovereign debt crisis whose effects are still being felt today. 
                                                            
4 “Redevelopment in California: The Demise of TIF-Funded Redevelopment in California and Its Aftermath.” George Lefcoe and 
Charles W. Swenson (National Tax Journal, 2014). 
5 In December 2007, the New York Times reported, “The Fed’s survey of bank lenders showed a steep plunge in standards that 
began in 2004 and continued until the housing boom fizzled.” Edmund Andrews (New York Times, December 18, 2007). 
6 A collateralized debt obligation is a type of structured asset-backed security that promises to pay investors based on the cash 
flow from a pool of bonds, mortgages or other income-producing assets it owns.  CDOs are often “sliced” into “tranches” which 
allocate interest and principal based on seniority.  If there is a default in the underlying assets and cash available from the CDO 
is insufficient to pay all of its investors, those in the lowest, most "junior" tranches suffer losses first. The last to lose payment 
from default are the safest, most senior tranches. Consequently, interest payments (and interest rates) vary by tranche with the 
safest/most senior tranches paying the lowest rates and the lowest tranches paying the highest rates to compensate for higher 
default risk.  
7 Bundled loans in this context refers to a mix of subprime home mortgage loans and regular mortgages structured as multi-
layered mortgage-backed securities, the income from which are distributed to investors who have purchased portions of such 
securities. 
8 “Declaration of the G-20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy.” November 15, 2008. g20.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Washington_Declaration_0.pdf.  
3 
cslf.gsu.edu  Effects of the Great Recession on Tax Increment Financing 
The years leading up to the crisis were characterized by an exorbitant rise in asset prices and an 
associated boom in economic demand.9 Housing and other real estate values nearly tripled from 1999 to 
2007.10 Further, the U.S. shadow banking system (i.e., non-depository financial institutions such as 
investment banks) had grown to rival the traditional depository banking system, yet was not subject to 
the same regulatory oversight, making it vulnerable to bank runs.11  U.S. mortgage-backed securities, 
which had risks that were hard to assess, were marketed around the world, as they offered higher yields 
than U.S. government bonds but were considered just as safe. Yet, many of these securities were backed 
by subprime12 mortgages, which collapsed in value when American homeowners began to default on 
their home loan payments in large numbers starting in 2007.13 
The role of investment banks, and the complex derivative products14 they created, in causing the financial 
crisis cannot be overstated. The 30-year period of financial deregulation that began during the Reagan 
administration and culminated during the Clinton administration in the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which had restricted affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms, resulted in the rapid 
expansion of the financial sector. Privately-held investment banks started going public15, bringing vast 
sums of stockholder capital, and mergers among such financial institutions led to the formation and rise 
of such gigantic combined commercial and investment banks as Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, 
Bank of America, Merrill-Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and others.16 
With the advent of internet stock trading and the development of new concepts in derivatives trading, 
the investment banking sector flourished, but often at the price of transparency and basic regulatory 
controls. Financial conglomerates, investment banks, and insurance firms were linked together in the 
trading of mortgage derivatives and other complex instruments in a system sometimes called the 
"Securitization Food Chain,"17 which consists of five positions: 
 Home buyers; 
 Lenders; 
                                                            
9 "Oil prices: George Soros warns that speculators could trigger stock market crash." Graeme Wearden (The Guardian, June 3, 
2008). 
10 “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index.” 
11 “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation.” Edmund Andrews (New York Times, October, 10, 2014). 
12 Subprime refers to the credit quality of particular borrowers who have weak credit histories and thus a greater risk of loan 
default than “prime” borrowers. 
13 “Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States.” 
(Government Printing Office, January 25, 2011).  Defaults grew as low adjustable rate mortgages converted to higher fixed rate 
loans and recession-related job losses accelerated. 
14 Derivative products are financial instruments (e.g., futures contracts or options) which are derived from other forms of 
financial assets. 
15 Going public means making all or a portion of a company subject to ownership by unrelated institutional and individual 
investors, typically through the issuance and sale of stock in the company, and is often employed by companies seeking to raise 
additional capital for their businesses. 
16 “Some Hope for the Future After a Failed National Policy on Thrifts.” Arthur Liebold in The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons 
from a Regulatory Failure by James R. Barth, Susanne Trimbath and Glenn Yago (Milken Institute, July 20, 2004). 
17 Collateralized Debt Obligations: Structures and Analysis. Douglas J. Lucas, Laurie S. Goodman and Frank J Fabozzi (Amazon.com, 
May 5, 2006). 
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 Investment banks; 
 Investors; and 
 Insurance companies. 
In this sequence, the home buyer granted to the lender a mortgage, which the lender then passed on to 
an investment bank who earned interest on it. The investment bank bundled such mortgages and similar 
debt instruments together into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) consisting of a mix of home loans, 
car loans, student loans, credit card loans and other consumer borrowings. The credit rating agencies, 
such as Moody's and Standard & Poor’s, accorded these CDOs high, investment grade ratings while being 
paid large fees by the investment banks for their rating services. The CDOs were sold to other investors by 
the banks, again based on the premise that they would earn interest. Insurance giants, such as AIG, then 
sold a type of CDO known as a credit default swap to investors and earned premiums in return. The credit 
default swaps were presented as a kind of insurance for the investors: if the rating of the CDO went 
down, then the insurer was to pay the investors for any loss in value. The insurance companies earned 
premiums from investors, as well as from the derivatives sold to speculators, transferring a large portion 
of the risk to their own balance sheets. 
As the investments appeared to be risk-free to investors, because the risks were borne by the insurance 
companies in exchange for premium income, the demand for CDOs grew. Investment banks sought more 
mortgages to form more CDOs to continue the food chain. And, in this climate, lenders started signing 
even riskier loans at their end of the food chain. 
BURSTING THE BUBBLE 
By December 30, 2008, the Case-Shiller home price index reported the largest price drop in its history.18 
Increased foreclosure rates among U.S. homeowners led to a crisis in August 2008 for the sub-prime, 
CDO, mortgage, credit, hedge fund, and foreign bank markets. As early as October 2007, the bursting 
credit bubble became the most significant risk to the economies of the United States and the western 
world. With loan losses mounting and the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a major panic 
broke out in the inter-bank loan market. There was the equivalent of a bank run on the shadow banking 
system, resulting in many large and well established investment and commercial banks in the United 
States and Europe suffering huge losses and even facing bankruptcy, resulting in massive government 
bailouts.19  AIG alone, one of the principal bundlers of credit default swaps, had to seek a line of credit 
from the Federal Reserve Bank in the amount of $182.3 billion to remain solvent.20 
The global recession that followed resulted in a sharp drop in international trade, surging unemployment 
and slumping commodity prices. Several economists predicted that recovery might not appear until 2011 
and that the recession would be the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
                                                            
18 “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index,” December 30, 2008. 
19 “Does He Pass the Test?” Paul Krugman (NY Times Book Review, July 10, 2014). 
20 "Investment in AIG." (U.S. Department of Treasury, December 2012). 
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The Market for Tax Increment Financings  
Nationally — 2000 thru Mid-2015 
Like the financial crisis of 2007 and the Great Recession that followed, the economic development 
opportunities created by TIF are inextricably linked to trends in real estate values. As real estate values 
increased during the period preceding the Great Recession, so did the use of TIF as a development tool. 
As real estate values decreased starting in 2008, so did TIF activity related to new development projects. 
Because TIF involves a delay between the payment of redevelopment costs and the projected benefits 
received, TIF naturally lends itself to the use of debt financing. Securitizing21 future tax revenues to pay 
current costs has, as a result, become a frequently used means of financing redevelopment projects in TIF 
districts, with such securitizations usually accomplished through the sale of bonds in the U.S. municipal 
market. The frequency, amount and structures of such securitizations can therefore reveal important 
trends in the use of TIF and the effects of rising and falling real estate values on the efficacy of this 
financing tool. 
TIF SECURITIZATIONS —  2000 THROUGH MID-2015 
One indication of these trends was the amount of TIF debt financings transacted over the periods before 
and after the onset of the Great Recession, as indicated by statistics from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC).22 These statistics include lists of, and information about, all publicly-offered TIF debt financings and 
refinancings (or “refundings”) transacted between January 1, 2000, and June 18, 2015 — the most recent 
date information was available at the time of this writing. The data also show important trends in the uses 
of TIF securitizations, the structure and pricing of such transactions and their evolving and devolving 
credit quality. 
General TIF Market Trends 
From 2000 through mid-year 2015, 2,547 individual municipal TIF bond issues were sold to investors by 
U.S. cities, counties and special districts, with a par value totaling $39.2 billion. As shown in Figure 1, the 
most active years in the study period were 2003 (in terms of the number of TIF bond issues) and 2006 (in 
terms of the aggregate par amount of bonds issued). The least active years were those from 2012 to the 
end of the study period, with a total of only 353 issues representing approximately $5.94 billion in par 
value. Two-thirds of the dollar volume and 64 percent of the number of transactions issued during the 
study period occurred during the eight-year period prior to the Great Recession (2000-07). The remaining 
one-third of total dollar volume, and of transactions issued, occurred in the last seven-and-one-half years. 
It should be noted that most of the downturn in total TIF bond issuance from 2012 onward resulted from 
California’s exit from the new money TIF market at the beginning of that year. Prior to that time, 
                                                            
21 Securitization is a means of transferring risk through the issuance of securities to provide additional funding sources to markets 
and/or projects. 
22 These data are available at thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum. 
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California had been by far the most active issuer of TIF bonds in the nation. (The state actually returned to 
the number one spot in 2013 with 25 transactions totaling $692 million; however, all of these 25 issues 
were refundings of prior TIF bond deals, which the law banning new money issues continued to allow.) As 
shown in Figure 2, over the nearly 15.5-year period under study, California agencies were responsible for 
1,221 TIF bond issues, representing over $27.1 billion in par value, or over 69 percent of all TIF issuance 
activity in the municipal markets.23 
  
                                                            
23 A total of 66 California agencies each delivered at least $100 million of TIF bonds in the municipal market, with the San Jose 
Redevelopment Agency leading the way with almost $2.53 billion in 25 separate issues. 
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Figure 1. Total TIF Bond Issuance Volume and Number of Issues,  
2000 through Mid-2015 
Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
Figure 2. California TIF Bond Issuance Volume and Number of Issues,  
2000 through Mid-2015 
 Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
However, the data show a similar impact of the Great Recession on TIF bond issuance, even when 
California transactions are removed from the analysis. As shown in Figure 3, the largest and smallest 
volumes of non-California TIF issuance were in 2005 and 2011, respectively, with a sharp decline in 
issuance going from 2007 to 2008, a steady decline thereafter and a sharp uptick in the par amount of 
8 
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transactions in 2013 – again due primarily to the level of refunding bond issuance rather than bonds 
issued for new redevelopment projects. 
Figure 3. Non-California TIF Bond Issuance Volume and Number  
of Issues, 2000 through Mid-2015 
 Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
Refunding versus New Money Issues 
Refunding bond transactions are motivated by the desire for interest savings; thus, their prevalence 
among TIF issues at any given time marks the availability of lower interest rates, not necessarily economic 
development opportunities. To gauge the effects of the Great Recession on TIF issuance properly, they 
should therefore be excluded from the analysis. When excluded, the decline in TIF bond issuance 
becomes even more pronounced: total TIF bond issuance from 2008 through mid-2015 fell 49 percent 
from the prior eight-year period, while new money TIF issuance dropped 60 percent. Overall, as shown in 
Figure 4, new money TIF issuance tracked economic activity more closely than did total issuance, dipping, 
for example, in 2002 due to the effects of the “dot-com” bust, and somewhat less so in 2005 due to that 
year’s economic slowdown, with such issuance rebounding the following year in each case. Conversely, as 
interest rates declined in response to each of those two slowdowns, refunding activity, and thus total TIF 
issuance, surged. 
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Figure 4. Total New Money TIF Bond Issuance Volume and  
Number of Issues, 2000 through Mid-2015 
 Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
Once again, however, the 60 percent drop in new money TIF issuance over the last half of the study 
period was heavily influenced, like total TIF issuance over that period, by California’s activity – or, in this 
case, the absence of such activity after 2011. As shown in Figure 5 below, new money issuance by non-
California jurisdictions dropped 51 percent from 2008 through mid-2015 versus the prior eight-year 
period. 
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Figure 5. Non-California New Money TIF Bond Issuance Volume and 
Number of Issues, 2000 through Mid-2015 
 Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
Largest Non-California TIF Practitioners 
Issuers from California clearly dominated the TIF market over the study period. Of the 10 largest TIF bond 
issuers since 2000, eight were in California. The top five TIF issuing states other than California were 
Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois and Texas.24 Colorado agencies led the field in terms of dollar 
volume issued (at $1.5 billion) but were the least frequent issuers in this second-tier grouping of states, 
with only 41 transactions over the study period. Minnesota municipalities were by far the most frequent 
non-California issuers with 399 transactions totaling $1.4 billion in par value. Yet, the dollar volume of all 
these transactions combined was dwarfed by TIF activity in California (see Table 1). 
  
                                                            
24 New York State’s version of TIF, payment-in-Lieu-of-Taxes (or PILOT) financing, was used on four high profile projects in New 
York City valued at $5.3 million. These issuances combined would have placed New York as the second largest TIF-like issuer in 
the country over the study period. Development District Bond Financings: The Good and the Bad, Nathan S. Betnun (Municipal 
Finance Journal, Spring 2012). 
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Table 1. Top Five TIF Bond Issuers — Non-California States, 2000 through Mid-2015 
STATE TOTAL $ VOLUME TOTAL NUMBER AVERAGE SIZE 
Colorado  $1,496,420,000  40 $37,410,500  
Minnesota  1,327,462,000  375  3,539,899  
Missouri  1,316,276,000  113  11,648,460  
Illinois  1,228,143,395  113  10,868,526  
Texas  1,088,104,073  81  13,433,384  
Subtotal  $6,456,405,468  722  $8,942,390  
California $27,110,721,028  1,221 $22,203,703  
Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
Apart from California localities, Denver’s Urban Renewal Authority was the largest single TIF issuer over 
the study period by volume ($800 million), followed by Atlanta with $578 million (over 98 percent of all 
TIF bonds issued in Georgia over the period) and Chicago with $526 million (over 41 percent of all TIF 
issues in Illinois). Minneapolis and Kansas City rounded out the top five non-California issuers during the 
study period with $367 million and $182 million, respectively. Again, the volume of all such non-California 
issuers was exceeded by that of California’s single leading TIF practitioner (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Top Five TIF Bond Issuers — Non-California Local Governments,  
2000 through Mid-2015 
STATE TOTAL $ VOLUME TOTAL NUMBER AVERAGE SIZE 
Denver $800,005,000  11 $72,727,727  
Atlanta 577,940,000  12 48,161,667  
Chicago 525,981,716  26 20,230,066  
Minneapolis 367,575,000  28 13,127,679  
Kansas City 181,780,000  13 13,983,077  
Subtotal $2,453,281,716  90 $27,258,686  
San Jose, CA $2,532,110,000  25 $101,284,400  
Source: Securities Data Corporation, thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum 
EFFECTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF TIF SECURITIES 
By decreasing real estate values, the Great Recession had a direct and adverse effect on economic 
development projects and the issuance of tax increment bonds that were designed to support them. It 
also had the effect of increasing risk aversion among TIF bond buyers. Dominated by high-yield mutual 
bond funds buying on behalf of other investors, portfolio managers were inundated in the early stages of 
the financial crisis by redemptions25 from shareholders, creating liquidity crises at many such funds. Those 
experiences in the early days, weeks and months of the financial crisis, as well as the panic selling their 
                                                            
25 Redemptions are calls from investors seeking to sell securities and/or liquidate a position in certain securities. 
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shareholders engaged in, left an indelible impression on high-yield “dirt bond”26 portfolio managers. Out-
of-the-ground TIF deals (i.e., bond transactions that took place as or before the construction of a project 
had gotten started, based solely on the conclusions of feasibility studies) that once were routine were 
largely snubbed. 
As a result, several changes were made in the structure and marketing of tax increment bonds in an effort 
to attract investors back into the TIF market. Those relatively few jurisdictions with the legal ability to do 
so responded by double or even triple-barreling27 the security for their TIF bonds with full faith and credit 
pledges, incremental sales tax pledges and special assessments.28 The use of financial advisors, as 
intermediaries capable of providing more objective information to investors about TIF bond security 
arrangements, increased over the study period. The assignment of underlying credit ratings on TIF bonds 
became more common in response to concerns by now more conservative investors about the collapse 
of the bond insurance industry29 and the unavailability of bank letters of credit for such financings. Both 
the overall volume of TIF issuance and average bond sizes decreased after 2007 (particularly when 
refunding transactions are excluded from the analysis). Final bond maturities, another structural measure 
related to risk, also began a gradual decline after peaking in 2006. Average interest rates on TIF bonds 
increased in the first four years of the Great Recession (2008-11) notwithstanding aggressive actions by 
the Federal Reserve Bank to reduce interest rates in general – another sign of risk aversion on the part of 
TIF bond buyers and the consequent demand for higher returns.30 
The Great Recession’s Effects on TIF in Georgia 
There is no central repository of information on TADs in Georgia that is easily accessible to citizens of the 
state.31 However, based on legislative records of local enabling acts, lists maintained by other 
professionals having an interest in the subject, and the author’s own research, there have been 91 local 
acts of the Georgia General Assembly that have authorized an equal number of cities and counties in the 
state to create TADs since the Redevelopment Powers Law was enacted in 1985. Of these jurisdictions, 63 
succeeded in obtaining voter approval to exercise redevelopment powers (and thus create TADs) as 
required by the Act. Of these 63 jurisdictions, 46 have adopted one or more redevelopment plans, which 
are necessary precursors to the creation of a TAD. Of those 46 jurisdictions, 39 currently have TADs in 
existence.32 A total of 73 TADs have been created by those 39 jurisdictions, including eight within the past 
two years (2014-15). Five of those jurisdictions “recertified” nine existing TADs either by changing the 
                                                            
26 “Dirt bonds” is a slang term used to describe securities whose underlying cash flows come from real-estate-based investments. 
27 Double and triple-barreling is the practice of pledging additional security over and above the primary source of repayment of 
an investment. 
28 Betnun (2012). 
29 Only two of nine active bond insurance firms survived the financial crisis with investment grade ratings. 
30 “Tax Increment Debt Finance and the Great Recession,” Martin J. Juby and Tima Moldogaziev (National Tax Journal, 2014). 
31 The Georgia Department of Revenue has a supposedly complete file of TADs in the state, but it must be viewed in person. 
32 An additional three jurisdictions are believed to be considering, or are in the process of creating, a TAD. 
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TAD’s boundaries or by abolishing the TAD and recreating it so as to reset base valuations to reflect 
recession-related losses. Five jurisdictions (Atlanta, Acworth, Clayton County, East Point and Savannah33) 
have issued bonds (the last being for Atlanta’s Perry-Bolton TAD in 2014), secured in whole or in part by 
incremental taxes, to finance redevelopment projects (see Table 3). 
  
                                                            
33 Savannah actually issued $20 million in full faith and credit bonds, with a plan to retire them from project-related tax 
increments.  Unfortunately, developers of the project that animated the TAD, Savannah River Landings, LLC, declared 
bankruptcy in 2010, requiring the city’s general fund to support since then virtually all of the debt service on those bonds, 
whose proceeds had already been spent on project-related infrastructure. 
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Table 3. Georgia Jurisdictions Fully Empowered to Create TADs 
JURISDICTION 
YEAR 
ENABLED 
TADS 
CREATED? 
TADS 
STILL 
ACTIVE 
  
JURISDICTION 
YEAR 
ENABLED 
TADS 
CREATED? 
TADS 
STILL 
ACTIVE 
Acworth 2002 Yes 1   Hapeville 1990 Yes 1 
Albany 2007 Yes 1   Hogansville 2010 No 
 Alpharetta 2006 Yes 
 
  Holly Springs* 2004 Yes 1
Athens-Clark 
County 2006 No 
 
  
Kennesaw 2002 Yes 
 Atlanta 1986 Yes 10   Kingsland  2011 Yes 1
Augusta-
Richmond 
County 2006 Yes 3 
  
LaGrange 2010 Yes 2 
Avondale 
Estates 2003 Yes 1 
  
Lawrenceville  2008 Yes 2 
Braselton 2007 Yes 1   Lilburn* 2007 Yes 1 
Buford 2007 considering 
 
  Macon-Bibb County 1986 Yes 3 
Bulloch County 2012 Yes 
 
  Marietta 2002 Yes 2 
Clarkston 2008 No 
 
  Norcross* 2007 Yes 1 
Clayton County 1989 Yes 6   Oakwood 2007 Yes 1 
Cobb County 2002 No 
 
  Peachtree Corners 2013 No 
 College Park 1990 Yes 1   Perry 1987 No 
 Columbus  2013 Yes 1   Pine Lake 2007 No 
 Conyers 2007 Yes 
 
  Riverdale 2007 Yes 
 Dalton 2014 Yes 2   Rome 2005 Yes 2
Decatur 2010 Yes 1   Roswell 2010 No 
 DeKalb County 2002 Yes 5   Savannah 2006 Yes 1
Doraville 2015 Yes 1   Smyrna 2002 Yes 1 
Douglas County 2009 No 
 
  Statesboro 2014 Yes 1 
Duluth* 2007 Yes 1   St. Marys  2007 Yes 1 
Dunwoody 2011 No 
 
  Stone Mountain 2007 Yes 1 
East Point 2001 Yes 2   Sugar Hill 2007 considering 
 Fayetteville  2011 Yes 1   Suwanee 2007 Yes 1
Flowery Branch 2007 Yes 1   Troup County 2010 Yes 
 Forest Park 2007 Yes 
 
  Union City 2006 Yes 1
Fort Valley 1987 No 
 
  Upson County 2007 No 
 Fulton County 1986 No 
 
  Warner Robbins 1986 No 
 Gainesville 2005 Yes 2   West Point 2009 No 
 Griffin 2008 Yes 2   Woodstock 2005 Yes 1
Gwinnett 
County* 2009 Yes 5 
  Total 63 46 73 
* TADs were recertified subsequent to its initial creation. 
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Jurisdictions that received state legislative approval to create TADs, but either did not create them, 
reversed an earlier decision to do so, or have yet to show any significant results, faltered for at least one 
of the following four primary reasons: 
1) Failure to receive the approval of a majority of the jurisdiction’s eligible voters to exercise such 
powers, as is required by law; 
2) Failure to consummate the necessary agreement(s) with developers to build a project, often due the 
developer’s inability to obtain private financing for the project; 
3) Failure to generate positive tax increments within the district; or 
4) Failure to receive approval from local school districts, or other overlapping governments, to include 
their taxes in calculating tax increments. 
The second and third of these reasons were most directly affected by the Great Recession, although it can 
be argued that concerns about an eroding tax base and recession-related cutbacks in state school 
subventions34 may also have had an effect on both school district participation and voter approval. In fact, 
many school districts in the state have been resistant to the idea of diverting incremental school taxes to 
fund economic development projects, even before the financial crisis occurred. Many believed that 
economic development was not an appropriate or legal use of school tax dollars, a position that was 
upheld by Georgia’s Supreme Court in its February 2008 ruling in Woodham v. City of Atlanta.35 
In response to the Woodham ruling, the Georgia General Assembly passed an amendment to the state 
constitution to allow financial participation in redevelopment projects by school districts. The 
amendment was approved by a majority of the state’s voters in November 2008, and the Redevelopment 
Powers Law was re-enacted by the General Assembly in 2009. Even then, however, many school districts 
in the state remained opposed to participating in TADs and either exercised their statutory right to refuse 
such participation (or threatened to do so) or exacted substantial payments-in-lieu-of-taxes from 
sponsoring governments, often scuttling the attempts of many cities and counties from moving forward 
with TIF. 
EFFECTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON TAD-ENABLED JURISDICTIONS  
IN GEORGIA 
Why nearly 40 percent of the 63 Georgia jurisdictions who gained legislative approval to exercise 
redevelopment powers failed to do so varies somewhat from place to place. But surely the effects of the 
Great Recession on property valuations, employment growth and governmental budgets must be 
counted among the principal reasons. As shown in Table 4 below, only nine of the 46 jurisdictions that 
actually created TADs were able to recover the property valuations lost during the seven years following 
the Great Recession’s beginning — and, even then, by only a small margin. 
                                                            
34 Subventions are grants of money, especially from one government (e.g., a state) to another (e.g., a school district). 
35 Woodham v. City of Atlanta et al. 657 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. 2008). 
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Although data on TAD valuations for jurisdictions outside Fulton County are not generally available, total 
property assessment data for each of these jurisdictions are accessible on the Georgia Department of 
Revenue’s website. Based on that information, the effects of the Great Recession on taxable property 
values in those 46 cities and counties can be measured. Table 4 shows the average annual rate of change 
in the total assessed value of taxable property (tax digest) of each of these cities and counties upon which 
redevelopment powers had been fully conferred. Data are shown for both the six-year period prior to the 
Great Recession and for the seven years following the recession’s onslaught. Every one of the TAD-
enabled jurisdictions saw growth in its pre-recession tax digests, at an average annual rate of 9.1 percent 
overall. All but nine, however, peaked in calendar year 2008 or 2009 and declined thereafter through 
2014 (the most recent year for which assessment data are available), at an average annual rate of 2.5 
percent.36 The largest average drop in values, of 3.8 percent occurred in 2011 and 2012. 
  
                                                            
36 Assessment information for tax/calendar year 2015 has not yet been posted on the Georgia Department of Revenue website. 
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Table 4. Total Assessed Value — Average Annual Percentage Change 
JURISDICTION 
2002-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2008-
2010 
2008-
2011 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2013 
2008-
2014 
Acworth 11.6% 0.9% -2.7% -3.8% -4.6% -4.1% -3.3% 
Albany 3.0% 0.9% -2.9% -2.2% -1.3% -1.1% -1.4% 
Alpharetta 10.4% 0.4% -2.0% -2.0% -1.7% -1.6% -3.2% 
Atlanta 7.7% -7.4% -2.4% -2.7% -2.9% -4.2% -3.0% 
Augusta-Richmond County 4.2% -1.5% -0.2% -0.1% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
Avondale Estates 4.7% 1.1% -0.2% 0.0% -4.0% -2.0% -1.1% 
Braselton 37.3% 5.0% -0.1% -3.1% -2.7% -2.9% 2.6% 
Bulloch County 8.1% 2.0% 0.2% -0.4% -0.9% -0.6% -0.1% 
Clayton County 4.9% -2.4% -7.9% -8.3% -8.6% -7.2% -6.0% 
College Park 7.4% 1.0% -5.3% 5.6% 1.5% 2.7% -0.6% 
Columbus 4.4% 2.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.7% 1.4% 1.7% 
Conyers 7.2% -5.0% -1.5% -2.7% -2.3% -4.6% -4.7% 
Dalton 5.9% -1.9% -5.3% -4.0% -2.7% -2.3% -2.2% 
Decatur 7.5% 3.3% 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1% 
DeKalb County 5.1% -2.8% -3.0% -6.2% -6.9% -5.5% -3.6% 
Doraville 7.3% -11.1% -7.1% -6.1% -8.8% -3.4% -3.6% 
Duluth 7.5% -0.2% -3.3% -5.4% -4.5% -3.8% -2.1% 
East Point 8.9% 1.3% -7.0% -8.6% -8.5% -7.8% -9.4% 
Fayetteville  8.7% -0.9% -5.0% -5.3% -6.8% -5.7% -4.8% 
Flowery Branch 33.4% 9.1% 3.8% -0.3% -1.5% -1.2% -0.4% 
Forest Park 9.8% -21.3% -17.2% -12.6% -11.0% -9.5% -9.1% 
Gainesville 6.8% -0.1% -1.6% -3.1% -2.8% -2.5% -0.1% 
Griffin 1.2% -2.6% -6.7% -5.3% -2.8% -2.2% -3.1% 
Gwinnett County 7.1% -1.2% -4.5% -5.3% -4.9% -4.2% -2.2% 
Hapeville 0.6% -6.3% -3.1% -7.0% -5.4% -4.9% -4.2% 
Holly Springs 21.7% -0.2% -3.0% -3.7% -5.2% -3.2% -0.4% 
Kennesaw 6.8% -0.5% -4.1% -4.6% -4.3% -3.7% -3.2% 
Kingsland 15.5% 6.1% 3.0% 1.1% -1.6% -2.5% -2.6% 
LaGrange 2.4% 3.2% 1.5% -2.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 
Lawrenceville 7.0% -2.9% -5.5% -6.8% -6.8% -5.8% -4.6% 
Lilburn 4.9% -1.9% -4.0% -5.2% -4.1% -3.6% -3.0% 
Macon-Bibb County 0.1% 12.3% 4.7% 2.8% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% 
Marietta 4.7% -0.9% -4.2% -4.7% -3.8% -3.3% -3.2% 
Norcross 7.3% -0.1% -4.4% -6.7% -2.5% -1.9% 0.0% 
Oakwood 11.2% 8.5% 4.2% 1.2% -0.9% -0.5% 1.0% 
Riverdale 4.5% -5.1% -8.4% -7.6% -7.8% -6.9% -6.1% 
Rome 4.9% 0.9% -1.5% -1.5% -1.2% -0.9% -0.9% 
Savannah 10.7% -1.5% -4.6% -5.7% -3.9% -2.8% -2.6% 
Smyrna 7.6% -0.3% -4.4% -4.6% -4.3% -3.7% -3.2% 
Statesboro 7.7% 1.8% -0.4% -0.6% -1.0% -0.5% 0.9% 
St. Mary's 13.6% 2.9% -2.6% -3.1% -4.1% -5.2% -4.9% 
Stone Mountain 3.9% -10.8% -7.3% -15.5% -12.4% -12.6% -9.0% 
Suwanee 12.9% 13.6% 0.2% -2.5% -1.8% -1.6% -1.1% 
Troup County 4.4% 1.7% -0.4% -1.8% -0.2% -0.1% -0.3% 
Union City 16.4% 1.4% -5.5% -2.6% -2.9% -3.8% -3.8% 
Woodstock 11.8% 1.0% -3.1% -5.7% -5.9% -3.2% 0.2% 
Average % Change 9.1% -0.2% -3.0% -3.8% -3.8% -3.2% -2.5% 
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The time lag between the beginning of the Great Recession and the most significant declines in assessed 
values among TAD-enabled jurisdictions is explained in large part by the nature of property assessment 
practices, which tend, even the best of times, to show up only after an economic cycle is well underway. 
Additionally, in Georgia’s case, state legislative actions effectively mandating lower assessments did not 
take effect until 2010. In 2009, the Georgia General Assembly passed House Bill 233, which placed a 
three-year moratorium on increasing (though not decreasing) property assessments. The accompanying 
Senate Bill 55 required local tax assessors to consider foreclosure sales, bank sales, distressed sales and 
the decreased value of property subject to conservation easements in determining the taxable value of 
real property. In virtually every taxing jurisdiction in the state, assessed values went down, in many cases, 
significantly. It is reasonable to infer that similar declines in taxable values took place in TADs created 
after the onset of the recession.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that TIF, which depends on incremental 
increases in taxable values to generate revenues for redevelopment projects, became a less useful, and a 
far less used, economic development tool in Georgia during the post-recessionary period. 
It should be noted, however, that TADs created prior to the Great Recession experienced sizeable 
increases in assessed valuations as a result of redevelopment activities therein, at least as evidenced ty 
TADs created in Fulton County (Georgia’s largest county).  As shown in Table 5 below, Fulton’s 14 TADs 
grew by a weighted average rate of 205 percent over their lives.  Virtually all of those increased 
valuations, however, occurred in the seven TADs created prior to 2006, where valuations grew by a 
weighted average rate of 259 percent. By contrast, the seven TADs created in or after 2006 grew by a 
weighted average rate of only 13 percent. Clearly, the use of tax increment financing by Fulton County 
jurisdictions prior to the Great Recession was met with significant success. 
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Table 5. Growth in Assessed Value of Fulton County TADs 
TAD YEAR CREATED BASE AV 2015 AV % GROWTH 
Westside (Atlanta) 1998  $270,693,404   $701,136,350  159% 
Atlantic Station (Atlanta) 1999  7,173,240   537,895,460  7399% 
East Point #1 2001  4,720,280   692,585,660  14573% 
Perry-Bolton 2002  66,022,880   152,620,430  131% 
Princeton Lakes 2002  826,760   114,321,850  13728% 
Eastside 2003  299,727,240   692,585,660  131% 
BeltLine 2005  542,867,760  1,387,082,330  156% 
East Point #2 2006  50,109,760   55,933,860  12% 
Campbellton Road 2006  115,744,000   127,543,320  10% 
Hollowell/MLK 2006  37,285,040   57,399,230  54% 
Metropolitan Pkwy. 2006  42,190,240   50,585,900  20% 
Stadium 2006  26,839,560   34,966,010  30% 
Union City 2007  52,964,800   42,920,140  -19% 
Hapeville 2008  7,809,720   6,069,800  -22% 
Total 
 
$1,524,974,684  $4,653,646,000  205% 
The Recession’s Effects on TIF in Atlanta 
With 10 tax allocation districts, the city of Atlanta has been the most active TIF practitioner and the most 
prolific issuer of TIF bonds in Georgia and, as pointed out earlier, the second most active issuer in the 
entire country among non-California jurisdictions. Atlanta and Georgia’s first TAD was Techwood, created 
in 1992 (later expanded and recertified in 1998 into what was renamed the Westside TAD), followed in 
order by the Atlantic Steel TAD (more popularly known as the Atlantic Station TAD) in 1999, the Perry-
Bolton TAD and Princeton Lakes TAD in 2002, the Eastside TAD in 2003, the BeltLine TAD in 2005, and the 
Campbellton Road TAD, Hollowell/M.L. King TAD, Metropolitan Parkway TAD and the Stadium 
Neighborhoods TAD (the so-called Commercial Corridor TADs) all created in 2006 (see Table 6). All but 
two city TADs were set to terminate after 25 years. 
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Table 6. City of Atlanta TADs 
 
SIZE                 
(SQ. 
MILES) 
CREATION 
DATE 
TERMINATION 
DATE 
BASE 
VALUE      
(IN 
MILLIONS) 
2015 
ASSESSED 
VALUE (IN 
MILLIONS) 
GROWTH 
% 
% OF 
CITYWIDE 
ASSESSED 
VALUE 
Westside 2.2 1998 2024 $271  $701 159% 3.3% 
Atlantic Station 0.3 1999 2024 $7  $538 7399% 2.5% 
Perry-Bolton 3.8 2002 20271 $66  $153 131% 0.7% 
Princeton Lakes 0.8 2002 20322 $1  $114 13728% 0.5% 
Eastside 2.0 2003 2028 $300  $693 131% 3.2% 
BeltLine 10.1 2005 2030 $543  $1,387 156% 6.5% 
Campbellton Road 3.6 2006 2031 $116  $128 10% 0.6% 
Hollowell/M.L. King 1.8 2006 2031 $37  $57 54% 0.3% 
Metropolitan Parkway 1.6 2006 2031 $42  $51 20% 0.2% 
Stadium Neighborhoods 0.6 2006 2031 $27  $35 30% 0.2% 
Total 26.8 
  
$1,410  $3,856 174% 18.0% 
1 Due to a 12-year delay in the issuance of TAD bonds for Perry-Bolton, the TAD's life was extended by the city in 2014 to 2041. 
2 Or until all redevelopment expenses have been paid, if earlier. 
With the exception of the four Commercial Corridor TADs, Atlanta’s TIF program can be considered to 
have been quite successful overall. The assessed value has more than doubled in all of the city’s other six 
TADs and have increased nearly 75-fold and 138-fold in Atlantic Station and Princeton Lakes, respectively. 
However, Atlanta’s success was mitigated by the effects of the Great Recession, just like that of other TIF 
districts in the United States and Georgia. As shown in Table 7 below, incremental tax collections in city 
TADs generally peaked in FY 2010 and 2011 (based on assessed valuations set at the beginning of 2009 
and 2010, respectively), before declining virtually across the board. 
As Table 8 more clearly shows, TIF collections in each of the city’s 10 TADs had slipped into negative 
growth territory by FY 2012 and, in all but two cases, remained in negative territory until beginning to 
recover in FY 2015. 
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Table 7. Tax Increment Collections — City of Atlanta TADs 
 FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30  
 
20071 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
Atlantic Station  $10,776,347  $14,191,942  $16,427,2043  $20,375,324  $19,357,582  $15,349,476  $14,566,523  $14,133,425  $16,215,088  $141,392,911  
Westside  7,973,422   12,087,366   15,939,0963   17,297,078   18,869,936   15,067,012   13,512,881   12,479,722   13,113,086   126,339,599  
Perry-Bolton  2,369,594   3,441,930   1,746,7682   4,036,659   4,053,145   2,785,277   2,548,312   2,534,599   2,561,013   26,077,299  
Princeton Lakes  506,105   1,328,005   1,772,4333   2,057,519   2,036,068   1,806,441   1,706,632   1,847,036   2,031,189   15,091,428  
Eastside  3,770,968   7,342,112   9,992,1063   10,550,204   16,420,123   10,537,112   10,646,019   9,838,785   11,680,420   90,777,849  
BeltLine –  10,016,750   6,431,4383   15,078,987   27,792,240   19,482,301   17,770,358   18,590,207   21,858,428   137,020,712  
Campbellton Rd. –  83,982   224,9183   334,936   1,541,076   525,203   325,031   154,282   65,180   3,254,608  
Hollowell/ 
MLK –    111,287   320,9713   430,467   669,357   529,884   341,398   343,431   352,255   3,099,050  
Metropolitan  
Parkway –  71,864   202,0323   287,285   607,361   366,667   168,815   143,700   206,898   2,054,622  
Stadium 
Neighborhood –  27,744   79,4753   95,176   182,890   15,509   932   1,271   1,494   404,491  
Total $25,396,436  $48,704,990  $53,138,4503  $70,545,645  $91,531,789  $66,466,894  $61,588,914  $60,068,472  $68,087,067  $545,528,657  
1 Changed from calendar to fiscal year. 
2 Reflects $2.1 million reimbursement to Atlanta Public Schools for school tax increments collected in 2008-09. 
3 Reflects $9.2 million reimbursement to Atlanta Public Schools for school tax increments collected in 2008-09. 
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Table 8. Annual Percentage Change in Tax Increment Collections — City of Atlanta TADs 
 FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30  
 
20071 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
Atlantic Station  – 32% 16%3 24% -5% -21% -5% -3% 15% 50% 
Westside – 52% 32%3 9% 9% -20% -10% -8% 5% 64% 
Perry-Bolton – 45% -49%2 131% 0% -31% -9% -1% 1% 8% 
Princeton Lakes – 162% 33%3 16% -1% -11% -6% 8% 10% 301% 
Eastside – 95% 36%3 6% 56% -36% 1% -8% 19% 210% 
BeltLine – – -36%3 134% 84% -30% -9% 5% 18% 118% 
Campbellton Rd. – – 168%3 49% 360% -66% -38% -53% -58% -22% 
Hollowell/MLK – – 188%3 34% 55% -21% -36% 1% 3% 217% 
Metropolitan 
Parkway – – 181%3 42% 111% -40% -54% -15% 44% 188% 
Stadium 
Neighborhood – –  186%3 20% 92% -92% -94% 36% 18% -95% 
1 Changed from calendar to fiscal year. 
2 Reflects $2.1 million reimbursement to Atlanta Public Schools for school tax increments collected in 2008-09. 
3 Reflects $9.2 million reimbursement to Atlanta Public Schools for school tax increments collected in 2008-09. 
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Two anomalies occurred in 2009 collection levels for the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs that were 
related to the ruling in Woodham v. City of Atlanta. Although Woodham, which struck down the use of 
school taxes to support redevelopment projects, was handed down in February 2008, both the Georgia 
constitution and the Redevelopment Powers Law were amended to re-authorize their use by April 2009. 
At that time, the pledge of city school tax increments to TAD bonds not already judicially validated and 
issued by Atlanta, as well as any conditions to any future such pledge, had not yet been determined. By 
the time of the city’s issuance of long-term TAD bonds for the BeltLine project in December 2009, 
however, an agreement with Atlanta Public Schools (APS) had been reached. That agreement specified 
that school tax increments would be pledged to the BeltLine bonds, as well as any future issue of Perry-
Bolton TAD bonds, if, among other conditions, Atlanta agreed to reimburse the school system any 
incremental school taxes generated within these two TADs prior to the reenactment of the 
Redevelopment Powers Law in 2009. As a result, approximately $9.2 million and $2.1 million attributable 
to increments credited to the BeltLine and Perry-Bolton TADs were paid over by the city to the school 
district.37 
ATLANTIC STATION, BELTLINE, EASTSIDE AND  
THE COMMERCIAL CORRIDOR TADS 
Although generally successful, Atlanta’s TIF program has not been problem-free. Declines in TIF 
collections have had significant effects on the Atlantic Station and BeltLine TADs, even though total 
collections in both TADs have grown overall. In Atlantic Station’s case, the problem has been an excessive 
amount of debt issuance in relation to actual increment collections. In the BeltLine’s case, it has been the 
agreements Atlanta entered into with its public school system and Fulton County regarding the 
distribution of “excess” TIF revenues. Disagreements between the city and the school district over those 
agreements have affected, albeit indirectly, the use of tax increments in the Eastside TAD, as well. Finally, 
the four Commercial Corridor TADs created in 2006 have seen very little redevelopment, although they 
continue to provide coverage for administrative expenses incurred by the city’s redevelopment agent, 
Invest Atlanta. 
Atlantic Station 
In 2001, the Atlanta issued $75.5 million of tax allocation bonds for phase one infrastructure 
development for the Atlantic Station project, the redevelopment of a 138-acre brownfield site in 
midtown Atlanta, occupied by the then abandoned Atlantic Steel manufacturing plant, into a high density 
live-work-play community. Due to the project’s highly successful launch, the city agreed to issue another 
$166.5 million in subordinate lien TIF bonds in 2006 to support the cost of constructing phase two 
infrastructure. While both bond issues were sold based on incremental taxes from prospective 
development (i.e., improvements not already in place), the latter issue was sold a year-and-a-half before 
                                                            
37 Similar reimbursements attributable to school tax increments collected in the Westside, Atlantic Station, Princeton Lakes and 
Eastside TADs during this time period were not made because TAD bonds already had been issued for those TADs, and the 
security for those bonds (including school tax increments) had been judicially validated. Under Georgia law, judicially-validated 
bond security arrangements are not subject to legal challenge on any basis. 
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the financial crisis and the beginning of the Great Recession. Payment of these junior lien bonds were to 
be supported by tax revenues projected to result from new condominium units, retail establishments and 
class A office buildings. And while most of those developments were completed, their absorption by 
homeowners, shoppers and office workers ground to a halt in late 2007 and 2008. 
As available space went unused, developer-owners converted condo units into lower-valued apartments 
and successfully appealed initial valuations by county tax assessors on other projects. As projected tax 
increments fell increasingly short of projections, payment of subordinate bond principal (which 
fortunately was to be handled by optional rather than mandatory redemption) was deferred, even while 
interest was being covered. As the years have passed, however, and tax increment collections continued 
to fall (having turned around only in 2015). 
Aggravating the situation, the city has made only one principal payment on the subordinate lien bonds 
since fiscal year 2010 (and only three payments overall), even while the Atlantic Station TAD fund balance 
was growing ($27.7 million at June 30, 2015). The city’s failure to pay down bond principal as originally 
planned in favor of investing TAD fund balances in money market funds yielding less than the interest 
rate38 payable on such bonds for a redevelopment project that is substantially complete seems odd. With 
$151.4 million in principal still outstanding, rising interest costs, and fewer than nine years remaining 
before the bonds are due, a default in the payment of these junior lien obligations could occur without 
substantial and sustained growth in Atlantic Station tax increments and the application of those taxes to 
bond payments between now and December 1, 2024.39 
BeltLine 
As the city of Atlanta has progressed in its TAD program over time, negotiations regarding the use of 
school tax increments — by far the largest single source of TIF revenues — have become increasingly 
complex. By the time the BeltLine TAD was created in 2005, those negotiations for the first time involved 
tax rebates, or payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (“PILOTs”), to APS. Such payments would come from TIF 
collections in excess of the annual debt service on bonds necessary to purchase right-of-way and begin 
development of the circumferential trail system that marked the BeltLine’s first phase of development. 
(Fulton County, Atlanta’s other TAD funding partner, insisted upon similar, albeit much smaller, PILOTs to 
help build out its countywide public library system.) Thus, based on development projections made just 
two years before the Great Recession, Atlanta agreed to a schedule of fixed annual PILOTs to each 
jurisdiction. As amended in 2009, the city would pay the school board a total of $162.4 million in PILOTs 
                                                            
38 The interest rate on the subordinate lien bonds is pegged at the Prime Rate. 
39 If the city defaults in the payment of Atlantic Station’s subordinate lien bonds, Georgia law provides that the TAD must remain 
in place and incremental tax collections (from the city, Fulton County and Atlanta Public Schools) must continue to be applied 
until all redevelopment expenses, which include principal and interest on bonded indebtedness, are paid.  
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over years eight through 25 of the BeltLine TAD’s existence and $27 million to Fulton County for library 
improvements over years six through 25.40 
The city’s PILOT obligations to both entities were based on a third-party consultant’s projections of ever-
increasing tax increment collections ranging from $22.4 million in year six to $320.4 million in year 25. 
Thus far, total TIF collections from the TAD in years six through 10 have ranged from a high of $27.8 
million in 2011 to a low of $17.8 million in 2013, with 2015 collections at $21.9 million. As Table 9 shows, 
unless the TAD’s tax collections improve considerably, and quickly, or unless the city can successfully 
negotiate a lower schedule of PILOT payments, particularly to the school system, additional leverage to 
fulfill the BeltLine’s promise simply will not be available from TAD bond proceeds. Such negotiations have 
been underway for more than two years, and while there have been recent indications of a breakthrough 
in those talks, no details have been made public. 
 
                                                            
40 As of January 1, 2016, the city is currently in year 12 of these two agreements. It is current on its payments to Fulton County 
but is $12 million in arrears to APS (after taking into account a December 2015 payment of $9 million from the city’s general 
fund). 
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Table 9. BeltLine TAD Cashflows 
YEAR 
FULTON  
PILOT 
APS  
PILOT 
TOTAL  
PILOTS 
OUTSTANDING  
DEBT SERVICE 
TOTAL 
REQUIREMENT 
TAD  
REVENUES EXCESS 
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS 
2011  $1,350,000   $–    $1,350,000  $6,579,419  $7,929,419   $27,792,240   $19,862,821   $19,862,821  
2012        1,350,000       –          1,350,000  7,361,194           8,711,194       19,482,301       10,771,107       30,633,928  
2013        1,350,000            1,950,000           3,300,000  7,386,519         10,686,519       17,770,358         7,083,839       37,717,768  
2014        1,350,000            6,750,000           8,100,000  7,468,438         15,568,438       18,590,207         3,021,769       40,739,537  
2015        1,350,000            6,750,000           8,100,000  7,495,881         15,595,881       21,858,428         6,262,547       47,002,084  
2016        1,350,000            7,500,000           8,850,000  7,524,750         16,374,750  
 
  
2017        1,350,000            7,500,000           8,850,000  7,539,519         16,389,519  
 
  
2018        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,559,475         17,236,452  
 
  
2019        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,573,588         17,250,565  
 
  
2020        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,685,522         17,362,499  
 
  
2021        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,683,359         17,360,336  
 
  
2022        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,685,219         17,362,196  
 
  
2023        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,684,428         17,361,405  
 
  
2024        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,684,322         17,361,299  
 
  
2025        1,350,000            8,326,977           9,676,977  7,683,038         17,360,015  
 
  
2026        1,350,000            9,365,152         10,715,152  7,683,538         18,398,690  
 
  
2027        1,350,000            9,428,377         10,778,377  7,683,597         18,461,974  
 
  
2028        1,350,000          15,056,142         16,406,142  7,685,794         24,091,936  
 
  
2029        1,350,000          15,516,311         16,866,311  7,682,716         24,549,027  
 
  
2030        1,350,000          16,004,504         17,354,504  7,571,041         24,925,545  
 
  
Total  $27,000,000   $162,436,302   $189,436,302   $150,901,353   $340,337,655  
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Eastside 
Stalled talks between Atlanta and its public school system on the BeltLine TAD have also indirectly 
affected activity in the Eastside TAD. As of June 30, 2015, a total of $68.8 million was available, in either 
unrestricted cash or supplemental reserve funds that could have been freed up as early as FY 2009, to 
address redevelopment needs in the district. This money has not been deployed in Eastside because both 
jurisdictions cannot resolve the amount of BeltLine-related PILOTs owed by the city to its school system. 
The original covenants related to the city’s Series 2005 TAD bonds for Eastside limited the use of tax 
increments to the payment of outstanding debt, meaning they could not be used for pay-as-you-go 
projects. At the same time, APS would have to approve any additional bonds for Eastside that might be 
issued after the TAD’s first five years of existence (i.e., after 2010) if such bonds are to be secured by 
school tax increments. The only exception to this latter requirement is for refunding bonds issued 
primarily for debt service savings. As balances in the Eastside TIF fund above those necessary to pay 
Series 2005 debt service continued to grow and as interest rates fell during the Great Recession, the city 
and Invest Atlanta began to consider a refunding of the outstanding bonds and a concomitant change in 
bond covenants to allow for cash-funded projects. As negotiations over BeltLine-related PILOT payments 
heated up, however, the likelihood that the school district would agree with the city’s premise that debt 
service savings were the “primary reason” for the refunding (as opposed to the expected covenant 
changes) began to diminish. Because APS would be required to consent to the refunding, the transaction 
has been delayed, presumably until the BeltLine PILOT dispute is resolved. 
Meanwhile, projects such as the redevelopment of Underground Atlanta, the extension of downtown’s 
trolley car system and many other potentially important downtown undertakings have not gained access 
to TIF funding — while TIF reserves are currently sitting in money market accounts doing very little good 
for the city. 
Commercial Corridor TADs 
Created by Atlanta in 2006, the four Commercial Corridor TADs are the smallest of Atlanta’s 10 TIF 
districts, have generated the least amount of incremental taxes (1.5 percent of total tax increments for all 
city TADs since their date of creation), and have seen the least amount of redevelopment activity. 
Incremental taxes and other revenues attributable to the four TADs have shrunk from just over $3 million 
in FY 2011 to just over $625,000 in FY 2015 (see Table 10). Yet, notwithstanding a combined balance of 
$6.23 million as of June 30, 2015, the only non-administrative redevelopment expenditures that have 
been made by the city in any of the four TADs over the past eight years was (i) $257,800 for a security 
grant to the Atlanta Police Department for security cameras in the Campbellton Road TAD, and (ii) 
approximately $51,000 in support of the Georgia Film and Television Center in the Metropolitan Parkway 
TAD. (A total of $648,000 in TAD funding had been approved to support the construction and equipping 
of a trade school operated by Corinthian Colleges, Inc. in the Campbellton Road TAD, whose total cost 
was estimated at $4.95 million, but Corinthian Colleges filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2015; and 
an additional $1.1 million has been approved for the Georgia Film and Television Center in the 
Metropolitan Parkway TAD.) Every other expense incurred in the four TADs has been for legal and 
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consulting fees, service charges and, in by far the largest amounts, direct and indirect administrative cost 
recovery fees to Invest Atlanta totaling $1.89 million, or 71.7 percent of total expenditures through June 
30, 2015 for these four TADs. 
As shown in tables 10 and 11, this administrative expense to total expense ratio compares to the same 
ratios for Atlanta’s other six TADs as follows: 
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Table 10. Corridor TADs — Campbellton Road, Hollowell/M.L. King, Metropolitan Parkway & Stadium 
Neighborhood 
 
FISCAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
Total Revenues $296,439  $828,163  $1,153,583  $3,009,665  $1,450,957  $845,183  $648,622  $625,827   $8,858,439  
Total Expenses  (35,482)  (22,247)  (634,971)  (457,276)  (410,185) (445,517) (230,903) (393,092) (2,629,675) 
Balance $260,957  $805,915  $518,612  $2,552,389  $1,040,772  $399,665  $417,719  $232,735   $6,228,764  
Admin. Expenses*  $35,482   $22,247   $634,971   $457,276   $410,185  $425,665  $211,850  $122,772   $2,320,449  
* Includes Investment Atlanta's direct and indirect costs of managing the TADs, as well as legal, consulting and audit, fees, feasibility studies and other service charges. 
Table 11. Invest Atlanta Expense/Total Expense by TAD 
TAD  TOTAL EXPENSES   IA FEES  
 
 IA/TOTAL  
Atlantic Station  $461,598,466   $393,307  
 
0.09% 
Westside  181,163,363   3,601,777  
 
1.99% 
Perry-Bolton  40,423,405   571,191  
 
1.41% 
Princeton Lakes  31,370,091   -    
 
0.00% 
Eastside  75,536,291   1,043,243  
 
1.38% 
BeltLine  261,672,146   1,370,017  * 0.52% 
Campbellton  953,557   533,566  
 
55.96% 
Hollowell/MLK  648,593   572,151  
 
88.21% 
Metropolitan  661,167   514,929  
 
77.88% 
Stadium  366,358   265,162  
 
72.38% 
Total $1,054,393,437  $6,979,535  
 
0.66% 
  * An additional $61.66 million have been paid to Atlanta BeltLine Inc. for its role in managing and  
  implementing TAD projects. 
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At the time these TADs were created the city was approaching the state-mandated cap on TAD creation.41 
Key city councilmembers wanted to ensure that some of the more challenged and underserved areas of 
the city where redevelopment could occur received TAD designations before growth in the city’s existing 
TADs eliminated the opportunity. Based on a consultant’s city-wide study,42 areas that appeared to have 
the highest potential for redevelopment were identified. Creation of the Stadium TAD was driven 
primarily by the opportunity to redevelop the area around Turner Field, well prior to the Atlanta Braves 
decision to move to Cobb County. The Campbellton Road TAD included the Fort McPherson 
redevelopment project and the possible redevelopment of Greenbriar Mall. The Hollowell/MLK TAD 
included a large parcel associated with a former public housing site that was slated for redevelopment 
into a mixed income residential neighborhood. And the Metropolitan Parkway TAD targeted the 
Lakewood Amphitheater site and adjacent parcels for redevelopment.  
 
The goal of all the Commercial Corridor TADs was to invigorate then largely downscale commercial 
corridors and strengthen nearby residential neighborhoods. That subsequent redevelopment plans and 
the Great Recession put a halt to most of these plans does not vitiate the initial goals and objectives the 
city originally planned to achieve. The greater amount of staff time required to assist these more 
challenged areas — as compared to many of the more “market-ready” areas of the city — to stabilize, set 
goals and engage the development community largely explains the disproportionate amount of 
incremental TAD-generated revenues that have been spent on administrative expenses, according to 
former Invest Atlanta staff.  
ESTIMATED FY 2016 TAD REVENUES 
According to assessment data obtained from the Fulton County Tax Commissioner’s Office, tax increment 
revenues generated in Atlanta’s 10 TADs are expected to be up significantly in the current tax year (or the 
city’s fiscal year ending June 30, 2016), based on preliminary 2015 assessments and current tax rates and 
collection levels. Those preliminary TAD assessments show increases of nearly 30 percent, or $21.5 
million overall, with the BeltLine (+42.6 percent), Westside (+27.8 percent), Eastside (+ 27.4 percent) and 
Atlantic Station (+26.9 percent) TADs leading the way. Only one TAD, Metropolitan Parkway, registered 
negative assessed value growth from 2014 to 2015. 
  
                                                            
41 The Redevelopment Powers Law limits the amount of TADs that can be created by a political subdivision to 10 
percent of total assessed property value in the jurisdiction at the time of such creation. 
42 “Revitalization Incentives for Underdeveloped Areas,” Bay Area Economics/Urban Collage Inc. (December 2005). 
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Table 12. Incremental Assessed Values and Tax Increment Revenues 
 
INCREMENTAL 
VALUES  
TAX YEAR 2014 
INCREMENTAL 
VALUES  
TAX YEAR 2015 
% 
CHANGE 
FY2015 
REVENUES 
EST. FY2016 
REVENUES 
ADDITIONAL 
REVENUES 
Westside  $336,835,346   $430,442,946  27.8%  $13,113,086   $16,757,254   $3,644,168  
Atlantic Station  418,191,330   530,722,220  26.9%  16,215,088   20,578,398   4,363,310  
Perry-Bolton  74,866,150   86,597,550  15.7%  2,561,013   2,962,319   401,306  
Princeton Lakes  108,388,220   113,495,090  4.7%  2,031,189   2,126,891   95,702  
Eastside  308,467,830   392,858,420  27.4%  11,680,420   14,875,948   3,195,528  
BeltLine  592,067,260   844,214,570  42.6%  21,858,428   31,167,411   9,308,983  
Campbellton  3,405,630   11,799,320  246.5%  65,180   225,828   160,647  
Hollowell/MLK  17,434,950   20,114,190  15.4%  352,255   406,386   54,131  
Metropolitan  11,290,290   8,395,660  -25.6%  206,898   153,853   (53,045) 
Stadium  -     8,126,450   NA   1,494   337,491   335,998  
Total $1,870,947,006  $2,446,766,416  30.8% $68,085,052  $89,591,780  $21,506,728  
Time will tell whether valuation increases such as these will be sustained beyond the current fiscal year, 
but the Great Recession’s effect on tax increment collections in Atlanta clearly appears to have ebbed. 
Considerations in Atlanta’s Management  
of TADs 
Because the city of Atlanta has instituted Georgia’s most active and comprehensive TIF program in 
Georgia, as well as one of the most active in the country, it is instructive to review some of the concerns 
that have been raised about the city’s TADs. In the most thorough review of the management of the 
Atlanta TADs, in May 2012, the City Auditor Leslie Ward, reviewed certain key aspects of the city’s TIF 
experience and reported the following findings:43 
 Neither the city nor its redevelopment agent, Invest Atlanta, has systematically tracked progress 
toward meeting redevelopment plan goals. 
 Planned redevelopment projects in Atlantic Station, Eastside, Westside, and Princeton Lakes have been 
substantially completed, and the city has collected more tax increments than needed to pay annual 
debt service on related TAD bonds; yet early retirement of TAD bonds does not seem to be a priority. 
 Trends in assessed values citywide and in tax allocation districts illustrate that public investment has 
spurred substantial growth in property value within the districts but also shows that districts have 
captured inflationary growth, thus reducing the city’s fiscal capacity to provide services within the 
districts and citywide. 
 Few if any projects have begun in the Commercial Corridor TADs. 
                                                            
43 “Performance Audit: Tax Allocation Districts,” Leslie Ward, City Auditor (City of Atlanta, May 2012). 
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 Redevelopment plans for eight of the city’s 10 tax allocation districts listed high poverty and 
unemployment among the reasons for establishing the district; yet socioeconomic conditions in tracts 
containing tax allocation districts still lag the city as a whole in measures of poverty, unemployment and 
vacancy rates. 
 While Invest Atlanta has processes in place to control developer costs, it does not subject its own 
operating costs and those of its affiliate, Atlanta BeltLine, Inc., to the same scrutiny and oversight. 
ATLANTA’S RESPONSE TO AUDIT FINDINGS 
City management agreed to all of the auditor’s recommendations and commissioned a study of these 
issues,44 as well as the completion status of each of the city’s 10 TADs,45 by an outside consultant in 2012 
and 2013, respectively. However, it is unclear (or at least there is no public record) of any actions taken 
by the city or Invest Atlanta on any of the auditor’s or consultant’s recommendations, except for 
continuing the practice of annual financial audits of each city TAD.  As of the writing of this report, the 
city’s TADs are largely stalled on a number of fronts. 
Other than the long-delayed issuance of Perry-Bolton TAD bonds in 2014, there does not appear to have 
been any TAD-related activity on the part of city management or Invest Atlanta during the current 
mayoral administration. Negotiations between the city and APS over the status of the Atlanta’s PILOT 
obligations related to the BeltLine TAD, after having been stalemated for three years, appear finally to be 
producing positive results, although as of this writing the details of those negotiations have not yet 
emerged. Until they do, funding for the BeltLine and Eastside TADs will likely remain stalled. 
As of June 30, 2015, nearly $28 million in unrestricted cash sits in the Atlantic Station TAD fund and nearly 
$5.7 million in the Princeton Lakes TAD fund, even though both projects are substantially complete. $54.4 
million sits in the Westside TAD fund and nearly $69 million in the Eastside TAD fund, yet no additional 
projects have been approved by the city for either TAD.  
Over $159 million in unrestricted funds is sitting in money market accounts, currently earning less than 
0.20 percent interest, and additional tax increment collections expected this year could be used to 
support additional projects or pay down related and much higher rate TAD debt. By so doing, Atlanta’s 
management could hasten the day when these TADs could be extinguished and free up additional TAD 
capacity for other parts of the city. 
Prospects for Future TADs in Georgia  
and Atlanta 
The U.S. and Georgia economies have begun to rebound from the Great Recession, though development 
and redevelopment activity throughout the country has lagged well behind levels seen before the 
                                                            
44 “Atlanta Tax Allocation Districts: Strategic Review,” HR&A Consultants (Invest Atlanta, June 6, 2012). 
45 “Tax Allocation District Completion Assessment,” HR&A Consultants (Invest Atlanta, April 5, 2013). 
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downturn. The use of TIF among Georgia localities has only just begun to return to pre-recession levels, in 
part because tax revenues and the availability of private capital have begun to rebound. With the 
exception of three jurisdictions (Augusta, Griffin, and Clayton County46), not a single new TAD had been 
created in Georgia between 2007 and 2012, even though 20 jurisdictions had received approval to 
exercise redevelopment powers during that period. Since 2012, however, eight new TADs have been 
established in seven Georgia localities.47 
Only two series of tax allocation bonds have been issued in the state since the beginning of the Great 
Recession.48 The first permanent bond financing for the BeltLine TAD, in the amount of $78,120,000, was 
brought to market in December 2009 at a tax-exempt yield of 7.45 percent on bonds due in 22 years. At 
the time, actual tax increments in the TAD covered annual debt service by over 110 percent and general 
market rates for high-grade tax-exempt bonds due in 22 years stood at or less than 4 percent. Pricing of 
the BeltLine bonds was clearly reflective of the still strong risk aversion among TIF investors, 
notwithstanding moves by the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates in general. (Unfortunately, the city 
did not have the luxury of waiting for a better opportunity to enter the bond market with its BeltLine 
bonds; it faced a deadline for refinancing an interim loan with local banks, allowing it to close on the 
purchase of the BeltLine’s northwest rail corridor and thus avoid the risk of losing $22 million in earnest 
money.) The first bond financing for the Perry-Bolton TAD, in the amount of $21,000,000, closed in 
February 2014 (12 years after the TAD’s creation) and was met with a much more positive response from 
investors, gaining a 5.00 percent yield on 27-year49 bonds, when actual tax increments in the TAD covered 
annual debt service by 130 percent and high grade bond yields were still at or less than 4.00 percent. 
A comparison of the pricing levels achieved on these two Atlanta TAD bond issues in relation to rates on 
high-grade bonds gives a good indication of how much the TIF market had improved since the beginning 
of the financial crisis. However, further improvement will be necessary before real estate values in 
general increase enough to support additional tax increment financing and the economic development 
activity it is meant to support. Development is occurring, but it has been financed primarily by private 
capital. Nationally, and in Georgia, equity capital and bank loans were the first sources of development 
funding to dry up at the onset of the financial crisis, one to two years ahead of the decline in real estate 
values that drove incremental tax collections down. (As one high-yield portfolio manager put it, “The lack 
of private financing was the first blow to TIF as a financing tool, while declining tax collections dealt the 
knockout punch.”) It is therefore not surprising that private capital would be the first funding source to 
return to the market, while TIF awaits additional incremental taxes. 
                                                            
46 Clayton County has created four TADs since 2007, all of them pay-as-you-go districts, only two of which have generated 
positive amounts of tax allocation increments as of the end of fiscal year 2014. Clayton County, Georgia, Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report, FY 2014. 
47 Cities of Columbus, Decatur, Dalton, Doraville, Kingsland, Statesboro and St. Mary’s. 
48 Savannah’s issuance of bonds in 2009 were actually full faith and credit obligations of the city, although the expectation at the 
time was that tax increments from the TAD in which the bond proceeds were invested would be the primary source of bond 
payment. That has yet to be the case. 
49 See note 1 on Table 7. 
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With real estate values still recovering, governmental incentives, where they have been employed at all, 
have largely taken the form of: tax abatement deals (first cousins to TIF), which have become a part of 
nearly every economic development financing in recent years; income tax credits, particularly the very 
popular New Market Tax Credit program administered by the U.S. Treasury Department; and direct 
subsidies in the form of joint venture financings of public-private projects, with the public portion, at least 
in Georgia, often involving direct cash contributions from development authority financings backed in 
whole or in part by the sponsoring city or county governments.50 
Signs that interest among TIF bond buyers is picking up also are evident. Although refundings of 
outstanding TIF bonds (i.e., those for projects already producing positive debt service coverage ratios) still 
dominate the market, conversations with major high-yield portfolio managers (e.g., CapRe, Nuveen and 
Invesco, etc.) indicate that additional risk will be considered for the right projects and the right returns on 
investment. 
Still, it is difficult to believe that TIF’s future is as promising as it seemed prior to the Great Recession. 
With California out of the market, both the volume and frequency of its use will, and already has, 
dropped significantly, with new money TIF issuance declining by two-thirds. The primary reason behind 
California’s exit from the TIF market — concern about local governments’ ability to cull school districts’ 
property taxes and the fact that other financing alternatives are available — may portend lesser reliance 
on and more conservative uses of TIF in other states as well. 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO TIF 
Among those financing alternatives is pay-as-you-go TIF, as opposed to the issuance of tax allocation 
bonds. Other than Atlanta’s recent plans to fund pay-go projects in the Westside TAD and its four 
Commercial Corridor TADs, perhaps the best example of its use in Georgia has been in Augusta, one of 
only two major Georgia jurisdictions to get actively into the TIF business in the post-recessionary period. 
In 2009, the consolidated government of Augusta and Richmond County created one large TAD that 
encompassed most of downtown Augusta and a portion of the county that extends north and east of the 
downtown along I-20 to include “Riverwatch” — the site of a 115-acre regional mixed-use retail and 
entertainment project to be located along the Augusta Canal.51 
Due to the effects on Augusta’s economy of the Great Recession, the development of Riverwatch had to 
proceed incrementally, with a Costco Wholesale Warehouse and a Cabela’s Outfitters store as the first 
major vertical developments. In each case, Augusta entered into a development agreement with the 
project developer whereby the city, joined by the county and the Richmond County School District, 
agreed to reimburse the developer for its infrastructure and other land development costs from the 
                                                            
50 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §48-5-220(20), counties may pledge ad valorem taxes at a rate of up to one mill to support debt service 
on development authority revenue bonds whose proceeds are used to foster economic development within the county. 
Georgia municipalities are empowered to pledge up to three mills to support development authority bonds issued for such a 
purpose. 
51 Augusta later split its mega-TAD into three separate districts, one of them comprised of the Riverwatch project alone. 
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incremental ad valorem taxes each store generated. Augusta also offered 65 percent of the local option 
sales tax (or LOST) revenues collected by each store, subject only to the stores’ timely reporting of sales 
taxes actually collected and remitted to the Georgia Department of Revenue. Similar incentives were 
offered to the developer for additional development at Riverwatch, funded by the incremental property 
and sales taxes generated by such additional development. This pay for performance model appears to 
be working well in Augusta and may be replicated in other Georgia cities (including Atlanta) in an effort to 
avoid the default risk inherent in TAD bonds. Although Augusta retained the right to issue bonds secured 
by incremental taxes and use the proceeds to fulfill its reimbursement obligations to the developer of 
Riverwatch, it presently has no plans to do so. 
Unlike TAD bond financings, which require incremental taxes in amounts sufficient to cover bond debt 
service by some minimum margin, pay-as-you-go TADs are able to deliver closer to 100 percent of the 
incremental taxes generated by a project to support their development cost. For Augusta and other 
Georgia localities with already established TADs, as well as any such localities enabled to do TIF in the 
future, pay-as-you-go TAD funding may become more prevalent among TIF-enabled jurisdictions in the 
state. 
Comparison with PILOT Deals 
The structure of Augusta’s development agreement and the use of TIF to confer tax benefits upon a 
project developer are not dissimilar in their effects to the more traditional PILOT (or “Phantom Bond”) 
structure, which has been used for nearly 25 years throughout Georgia as a means of attracting 
businesses to localities. As ratified in 1981 by the Supreme Court of Georgia,52 the structure involves 
acquisition of a real estate asset by a local development authority from a private developer through the 
issuance of revenue bonds (which usually are purchased and held by the developer) and a lease-back 
agreement to the developer in consideration of a fixed schedule of PILOTs and the obligation to pay all 
other costs of ownership. 
Ownership of the asset by the development authority results in an exemption from ad valorem taxation 
by city, county, school and other taxing districts; this allows the PILOT to be negotiated at a lease rate well 
below the ad valorem tax that otherwise would be owed on the project. By custom, the lease typically is 
for a 10-year term at a lease rate initially equal to 50 percent of the property tax liability, which then 
increases in 5 percent annual increments over the remaining term of the lease. By the end of the lease 
term, the payor has fully amortized the bonds as well as the PILOT obligation and receives clear title to 
the asset. Georgia law does not impose any specific terms on PILOT deals, and some development 
authorities are more generous than others depending upon a project’s economic impact. (However, a 
bond-lease transaction may violate Georgia’s constitutional requirement of uniform taxation if other 
taxpayers in the same jurisdiction who leased similar property financed by bonds did not, or do not, 
                                                            
52 DeKalb County Board of Assessors v. W.C. Harris & Co., 248 Ga. 277, 282 S.E.2d 880 (1981). 
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obtain similar terms.53) Bond-lease or PILOT financings have become increasingly popular over the past 25 
years,54 even though they do not always confer as much financial assistance as TADs do. They are, 
however, easier to implement, particularly for single asset developments, and require no state-level 
legislative action, local voter approval, the consent of overlapping jurisdictions, or the preparation and 
adoption of redevelopment plans. 
Lessons Learned 
In their first full decade of active engagement with TIF, and after an economic downturn that lasted 
almost eight years, Georgia localities have, or should have, learned several lessons that could improve the 
financing and implementation of redevelopment projects going forward. In the 2005, “A Policy Guide to 
the Evaluation and Use of Tax Allocation Districts,” faculty at GSU’s Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
outlined ways of capitalizing on the benefits of TADs while hedging against their risks. Additionally, the 
2012 Audit of the city of Atlanta’s TAD raised some important issues that the city of Atlanta, as well as 
other Georgia jurisdictions, would do well to consider. The recommendations from these studies include: 
1) Use TADs as part of an overall planning and economic development policy with clearly defined 
economic development goals. 
Allocate incremental tax dollars to TAD projects within the intended scope of the redevelopment plan, 
and reallocate such dollars to projects not originally contemplated by the plan by formal amendment 
to the plan, including (i) establishment of the “but-for” test related to a project or projects within the 
expanded scope, (ii) the proposed specific uses of funds, (iii) the anticipated benefits to be produced 
by the private sector entity receiving assistance, and (iv) meaningful sanctions, such as a claw back 
provisions, for failure to meet goals. 
2) Conduct full and careful feasibility, fiscal impact and cost-benefit analyses of proposed TAD projects 
and estimate TAD revenues conservatively, particularly if they are to be used to back debt. 
3) Perform annual budgets, performance audits and evaluations, as well as financial audits, to determine 
private sector progress toward achieving redevelopment plan goals and to show how public funds are 
being used to support those redevelopment plans. 
4) Target TADs for projects where private sector investment is unlikely without public sector involvement, 
focusing in particular on the redevelopment of brownfields, areas with significant levels of urban blight 
and the reuse of old industrial or decommissioned military facilities. 
                                                            
53 “Georgia Ad Valorem Tax Incentives through Bond-Lease Transactions in Georgia,” James P. Monacell, Esq., Smith Gambrell & 
Russell, LLP, June 6, 2007. 
54 Bond-lease financings have become so popular in the state that the largest taxpayer in the city of Atlanta is the Fulton County 
Development Authority with total real estate holdings, all acquired as a result of bond-lease financings, that had an estimated 
market value of $2.3 billion in 2014 — approximately 225 percent larger than the combined holdings of the city’s second largest 
taxpayer, the Georgia Power Company, in that year. 
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5) Minimize direct public sector subsidies in favor of strategies that share risk with the private sector; 
reevaluate TADs that fail to attract meaningful redevelopment activity; work with strong private sector 
partners; and avoid governmentally-initiated speculative projects. 
6) Be conservative in the use of TAD-backed debt; use pay-as-you-go funding when and where feasible. 
7) Review surplus tax increments on an annual basis once a redevelopment plan is substantially 
completed and establish criteria for using that surplus increment to pay down debt; return excess 
increment to participating jurisdictions; or reallocate it to a debt service reserve or a specific 
development project. 
OTHER LESSONS 
In addition, the Great Recession highlighted at least three important preconditions to the successful 
implementation of tax increment financing in Georgia’s cities and counties: 
The need for one or more catalytic projects to justify financial participation by local governments; 
Buy-in by local school districts, typically the chief contributors of incremental property taxes in any 
jurisdiction; and 
If TIF-backed debt is needed due to the scale and timing of a redevelopment project, better protections 
must be provided to TAD bond purchasers. 
TIF — No Field of Dreams 
Many of Georgia’s TIF-enabled cities and counties have embraced TIF as one of many tools that can be 
used to entice development to their jurisdictions. And, indeed, tax increment financing can be a powerful 
incentive for private sector-led redevelopment projects. But TIF alone will not in and of itself create 
private sector enthusiasm; an “if we build it, they will come” approach rarely pays dividends to localities 
that do not otherwise have assets in place that will inspire private investment. It was the Atlantic Station 
development team’s vision of what could be done with the an abandoned steel mill and surrounding 
brownfield in midtown Atlanta, and the private sector investors who supported that vision, that created 
the impetus for the kind of public-private partnership necessary to support the use of TIF. It was interest 
from Costco and Cabela’s and the demand for their goods and services in the Augusta market, and the 
development team who supported that interest, that created the opportunity for what has occurred in 
the city’s Riverwatch TAD. It was the brainchild of a single Georgia Tech graduate student that conceived 
the stitching together of dozens of Atlanta neighborhoods abutting Atlanta’s old railroad loop and the 
diligence of an individual investor who optioned the northeast portion of that loop that brought about the 
BeltLine. It was the lack of convenient retail outlets and the opportunity for profit by providing them that 
turned a former dump into a thriving power center in Acworth, that built one of the metro Atlanta area’s 
largest mixed-use development in the adjacent Camp Creek and Princeton Lakes TADs, and that is building 
mixed-income housing, supportive retail and recreational improvements on the sites of former public 
housing projects in the Perry-Bolton TAD. 
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While there are a few examples of public money taking the lead in supporting important redevelopment 
projects, such as Atlanta’s new Center of Civil and Human Rights in Atlanta’s Westside TAD, the 
preponderance of successful public-private ventures are created and led by private profit-seeking 
enterprises. Having TIF in a jurisdiction’s tool kit can be helpful in supporting the cost of major private 
development projects, but it cannot create or sustain them. One need only look at Macon and Augusta’s 
continuing efforts to attract private redevelopment projects in their deteriorating downtown areas, 
Savannah’s efforts through extensive investments in public infrastructure projects to support the failed 
Savannah River Landing development, Woodstock’s initial effort to create a more attractive, lively and 
user-friendly downtown, Atlanta’s four Commercial Corridor TADs and dozens of other such public sector-
led efforts to see the validity of this fact. It is when private investment is coupled with public 
infrastructure support that TIF is most effective, and, even then, a severe economic downtown can upend 
even the best of well-laid plans, as was seen throughout the country during the Great Recession. 
School District Involvement 
In Georgia and elsewhere, school districts depend on two principal funding sources: state educational 
subventions and local property taxes. Because Georgia school districts are thus limited as to local tax 
sources, they rely much more heavily on property taxes than cities and counties sharing the same 
jurisdiction, and they levy such taxes at significantly higher rates — typically twice as high, or higher, than 
overlapping local governments. As a result, incremental school taxes are the most important potential 
sources of funds for TIF programs. 
Yet, the receivers of those school taxes are typically the least involved and the least “schooled” in the 
benefits and risks of urban redevelopment projects. Many do not regard redevelopment as a legitimate 
use of their tax dollars, despite statewide referenda making such activities legal. School districts also 
stand to lose the most by aggressive and inappropriate use of TADs because the TAD financing captures 
and redirects revenues that could be used to support growth in student enrollment (which may in turn be 
caused by TAD-financed developments). Resistance to participation in such projects, at least in states like 
Georgia where such participation is optional, is thus almost ingrained among many local school 
administrators, and many a city or county’s redevelopment visions have been stymied by school district 
intransigence. Most Georgia jurisdictions that have undertaken TIF have had to deal with some 
resistance, and more of them have failed than succeeded. The exercise of redevelopment powers have 
been weakened, if not eviscerated, by the lack of school district participation in many counties that had 
embraced TIF as a redevelopment tool, among them Cobb County, Cherokee County, Fulton County, 
DeKalb County, Bibb County and others. 
Strategies that have had some success in convincing school districts to participate in TIF programs have 
included: (i) reimbursement requirements covering any losses incurred by a school district under state 
educational funding formulas that take into account local tax revenue collections (e.g., Eastside, 
Westside, BeltLine, Perry-Bolton and Princeton Lakes TADs), (ii) capping the amount of tax increments 
that can be leveraged in TAD bond transactions (e.g., Acworth’s Lakeside TAD, Eastside and Princeton 
Lakes TADs), (iii) requiring reimbursement of school tax increments in excess of annual debt service on 
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such bonds (e.g., Lakeside and Camp Creek TADs), and (iv) allocations from TAD bond proceeds or annual 
tax increments for specific school or school-related capital projects (e.g., Eastside, Westside, BeltLine and 
Savannah’s East Downtown TADs). Though less frequently encountered, similar arrangements with 
overlapping county governments have had to be negotiated by municipal sponsors of TIF programs (e.g., 
Lakeside and BeltLine TADs). 
However, the most effective argument for local governments participating in TIF-funded redevelopment 
projects is the net gain incurred from the investments they make. Like any investment, there are risks 
involved in TIF, but in Georgia’s experience thus far, those risks have been more than offset by the 
financial returns obtained from that participation. In Atlanta’s case alone, TIF has contributed nearly $2.5 
billion to the tax digest of the city — and the city’s school system — over the last two decades, a 10 
percent gain. 
TAD Bond Credit Enhancements 
Given the effects of the Great Recession on TIF bond buyers, additional attention will need to be paid to 
the creditworthiness of TAD bond issues. First and foremost, sponsoring governments must avoid 
overleveraging existing, as well as expected, tax increments by using more conservative projections of the 
tax revenues produced by any given redevelopment project, avoiding the inclusion of inflationary factors 
in forecasting such revenues, and using relatively high ratios of expected revenues to debt service. For 
“out-of-the-ground” projects, prudent and rigorous feasibility studies are needed, showing a range of 
project scales, development timetables and asset valuations for tax purposes (based on actual 
conversations with local assessors about their actual valuation methodologies). 
Attention also should be paid to the availability and feasibility of additional sources of payment for 
redevelopment expenses. Incremental local option sales taxes can comprise a significant portion of the 
incremental taxes generated by a redevelopment project and thus have significant effects on covering 
redevelopment project expenses and/or TAD bond debt service. Unfortunately, the Georgia Department 
of Revenue has not yet devised an accessible system for determining sales tax collections by location 
within individual taxing jurisdictions, either for individual or multi-location retailers. However, most local 
business license taxes are based on individual store sales, which are reported annually by store location. 
While such data include sales of non-taxable merchandise, algorithms could be developed, and have been 
developed (see Clayton County’s Ellenwood TAD), that would allow conservative estimates of taxes 
collected on such sales. Such revenues created by new development within a TAD go into the general 
funds of all such taxing jurisdictions and thus may legally be used to pay, or serve as a back-up source of 
payment for, redevelopment expenses. 
Community Improvement Districts (CID) and other forms of self-taxing special districts could be overlaid 
on tax allocation districts, and the additional taxes collected in the CID (typically set at 5 mills) could be 
used as security, or back-up security, for TAD bonds or as additional funding sources for pay-as-you-go 
redevelopment projects. Similarly, the creation of a coterminous Urban Redevelopment Area, as 
authorized by Georgia’s original redevelopment statute, the Urban Redevelopment Law of 1955 (O.C.G.A. 
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§36-61-1 et seq.), could allow sponsoring jurisdictions to significantly enhance the creditworthiness of 
their TAD financings. Pursuant to a separate but complimentary state constitutional provision, a 
sponsoring government could enter into a long-term intergovernmental contract with its urban 
redevelopment agency (URA), which can be created under the law without specific state legislative 
approval, and pledge as much as the jurisdictions’ full faith and credit to secure URA revenue bonds for 
redevelopment projects within the TAD. Incremental taxes alone could be used to pay debt service on 
such bonds, or they could be supplemented by payments made by the sponsoring jurisdiction under the 
intergovernmental contract. The full faith and credit pledge alone would enhance the creditworthiness of 
the bonds significantly; how much would depend on the creditworthiness of the sponsoring government. 
As the national, Georgia and Atlanta economies continue to rebound from the Great Recession, TIF 
undoubtedly will regain some of the popularity it enjoyed through most of the last decade.  
Its continued viability as a redevelopment tool, however, will depend on the foresight and wisdom of the 
leaders of TIF-eligible jurisdictions, the participation and cooperation of overlapping governments, 
continued interest in the financing technique among high-yield and other bond investors, and the 
availability of private capital seeking profitable enterprises. Economic cycles will ebb and flow, but the 
redevelopment of the America’s and Georgia’s urban areas will continue. 
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